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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that (1) the negative relationship between initial firm 
size and failure probability, and (2) the aging pattern of the failure rate are sensitive to 
the adopted definitions of entry and exit.  We use two definitions to measure the 
timing of entry and exit: an economic definition, based on employment levels, and a 
legal definition, based on the firm's legal status. While initial size is negatively 
related to the exit rate under the economic definition, the relation becomes positive 
under the legal definition.  The aging effect is much steeper under the legal than under 
the economic definition. 
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I. Introduction 
The increased availability of finn level data sets in recent years has led to a 
series of papers that investigate the post-entry perfonnance of new firms (e.g. 
Agarwal and Audretsch, 1998; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 
1994). One of the "stylised facts" that comes out of this literature is that start-up size 
is negatively related to the probability of finn exit.! The explanation commonly given 
in the literature (e.g. Caves, 1998) for this finding is intuitively appealing. Finns enter 
at different sizes, which suggests they have different expectations and options about 
their costs or product markets. Firms with more positive expectations make larger 
initial commitments than firms with more negative expectations. The latter, however, 
incur a larger initial unit cost by limiting their entry size. Therefore, we may expect 
that small entrants are more likely to fail than large ones. A number of theories that 
investigate firm dynamics can generate such a negative relationship between start-up 
size and the probability of exit. For example, the learning models of Jovanovic 
(1982) and  Pakes and Erikson (1989) model the growth process as a stochastic 
process where firms learn their true cost structure over time. These learning models 
establish a positive correlation between efficiency and size, which is the driving force 
behind the empirical predictions on growth, survival and size. 
The main contribution of this paper lies in demonstrating that the 
aforementioned empirical "stylised fact" of the negative relationship between initial 
size and the probability of failure depends very much on the way in which finn exit is 
defined.2 We use both an economic and legal definition of firm entry and exit, and 
find that the impact of start-up size on finn exit is highly sensitive to the definition 
that is used. Furthennore, our results show that this choice of definition also affects 
the resulting aging patterns associated with the exit probability, as well as the impact 
of other often-included cross-sectional control variables. 
The first definition of exit that we consider, based on the firm's reported 
employment figures, has been used extensively in the industrial organisation literature 
that studies firm growth and survival. Under this definition, firms disappear from the 
1 For overviews see Audretsch (1995), Caves (1998), and Sutton (1997). 
2 Recently, Audretsch et al. (1997) find that the effect of initial size on firm survival differs also 
between the service and manufacturing sectors. In particular, they find that firms with a start·up size of Defining Firm Exit: The Impact of Size and Age Revisited 
data set, i.e., exit, when employment falls to zero and does not become positive again 
during the observation period.3 We call this the economic definition of exit, which has 
also been adopted by Audretsch, Houweling and Thurik (1997), Audretsch, Klomp 
and Thurik (1997), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata and Portugal (1994), and 
Wagner (1994), among others. The reasoning behind this operationalisation is that the 
firm ceases to engage in economically meaningful activities when it must operate 
without employees. Empirical studies in the accounting and finance literature, in 
contrast, tend to use the legal dates of  failure to determine the timing of exit. For 
example, either the bankruptcy (chapter 11) filing date, the liquidation (chapter 7) 
date, or the last date for which financial data was published were used as the exit date 
in Altman (1968), Casey and Bartczak (1985), Gentry, Newbold and Whitford 
(1985,1987), Platt and Platt (1990) and Zavgren (1985), among others. This is the 
second definition of exit that we consider. 
The timing of entry is usually more arbitrary and less clearly defined in the 
empirical literature. Many studies give no details about how entry was determined, 
and those that do are characterised by a lack of uniformity.  In the entrepreneurship 
literature, for example, the timing of entry has been established by the date on which 
firms have first opened a bank account (Cressy, 1996) or through questionnaires 
(Coopers, Gimeno-Gason and Woo, 1994). Most papers in industrial organisation 
either use official registries (Audretsch, 1995b) or define an entry as a firm that 
appears with positive employment for the first time in the data set (e.g. Audretsch, 
Klomp and Thurik, 1997; Mata and Portugal, 1994). 
In this paper, we illustrate the importance of entry and exit definitions on the 
obtained empirical results regarding the exit behaviour of firms. Section II describes 
the data. In section ill  we discuss the empirical implications of the two definitions. 
Section IV concludes our study. 
II. Sample description 
Our data cover 14,584 manufacturing firms located in the Northern part of 
Belgium, Flanders, that started operations between 1985 and 1994, and reported 
positive employment before 1211994. The data are retrieved from the registry of the 
less than 5 employees are less likely to survive, but this negative relationship between initial size and 
exit becomes insignificant for service firms that enter with more than 5 employees. 
3 Note that a firm with an observed employment pattern 2-2-0-1-2-0 has an economic exit in year 6 
only. 
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Central Bank, where all firms are legally required to submit their company accounts. 
Hence, we cover virtually the entire population of manufacturing firms that report 
positive employment within our observation period.4 Each of these firms was tracked 
through 1211994 to determine whether they failed within this period. This data set 
allows us to analyse all cohorts of new entrants over this period, rather than focusing 
only on the cohort say of 1985, which is a common, yet more restrictive, procedure in 
firm survival studies. 
In our data set, economic entry occurs in the year when positive employment 
is first reported. The legal entry year is defined as the year in which the firm received 
its VAT number. For each of the firms in our dataset, both economic and legal entry 
were observed. Economic exit occurs in the year when a firm no longer reports 
positive employment, while legal exit occurs when the courts declare that the firm is 
bankrupt or must be liquidated. Hence, we use the same set of firms to assess the 
potentially confounding impact of entry and exit definitions on some stylised 
empirical facts in the firm-survival literature. 
A first indication of the importance of the definition adopted become apparent 
from some simple summary statistics. Under the economic definition, 20.43% of the 
firms exit, while only 8.79% of the firms exit under the legal definition. Hence,  the 
economic definition significantly exceeds the legal exit. Only 8.69% of the firms exit 
under both definitions. While 98.8% of the firms with legal exit also experience 
economic exit, 42.5% of firms with economic exit have no legal exit. Economic exit 
tends to occur either before or in the same year as legal exit: 81.3% of all exits 
experience legal exit in the same year or the year after economic exit. With respect to 
the entry definitions, we find that economic and legal entry occur within 2 years of 
each other for 92.6% of the observations. Economic entry never occurs before legal 
entry, and 50.3% of the observations have the same entry year under both definitions. 
These figures therefore suggest that a substantial number of firms operate with zero 
employees in the first or last years of  their existence. An explanation for this finding 
might be found in the use of interim labour and outsourcing. We explore  this issue 
further in the next section where we analyse whether the difference between the legal 
4 The dataset at our disposal consists of all Belgian firms that are subject to the Belgian accounting law, 
which obliges them to publish annual accounts.  All incorporated enterprises that carryon a 
commercial activity, whether or not they are listed on a stock exchange, publish full or abbreviated 
accounts.  This means that even small companies, with some minor exceptions, are subject to the 
accounting law concerning the preparation and publication of accounts.  Belgium has indeed gone 
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and economic definition of exit affects the empirical relationship between firm size 
and the exit probability. 
III. Empirical results 
We investigate the exit rate of new firms using a hazard approach. We start by 
estimating a Cox (1972) model with a parametric Weibull specification for the aging 
pattern. Next, we examine the robustness of our findings: first, we consider whether 
the assumption of a parametric time dependence affects our results, and then we 
examine whether the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity has a substantive 
impact on our findings. The methodology is explained in detail in the appendix. 
We follow the literature, and assume that the firm level hazard is a function of 
firm specific variables, sector variables and aggregate economic conditions, all 
measured during the start-up year. Firm start-up size is measured by the initial 
employment level, as is common in this literature (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 
1995, and Mata and Portugal, 1994). The sector variables, included as control 
variables, are (1) the minimum efficient scale (MES) proxied by the median 
employment for the industry at the three digit level of the NACE classification, (2) the 
capital intensity of the industry proxied by total tangible fixed assetsS of the industry 
normalised by industry sales, (3) the herfindahl index of concentration, and (4) an 
indicator of the homogeneity of the sector. The latter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the sector is neither advertising nor R&D intensive, and zero otherwise. The source 
for this variable, which proxies for the absence of endogenous sunk costs in the 
sector, is Davies and Lyons (1996), who classify European sectors in R&D intensive, 
advertising intensive and homogeneous sectors. 
Firms starting in different years may face different aggregate economic 
conditions during their start-up year. We control for this difference through the 
corresponding growth in real GDP. We also take into account a potential aging effect. 
As in Dekimpe and Morrison (1991), who study the survival of retail firms, our first 
model assumes a Weibull distribution for the aging effect. A more flexible 
distribution is adopted later in the paper. 
much further than was required under the terms ofthe European Union's Fourth Directive.  Financial 
intermediaries and hospitals are subject to special rules, and are therefore excluded from the sample. 
S Tangible fixed assets are included in the balance sheet at their historic cost after depreciation. 
However, they can be revalued at regular intervals.  If this is the case, the depreciation charge is based 
on the revalued amount. 
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Table I gives the results of the Weibull model. Model A uses the economic 
definitions of entry and exit, while model B uses the legal definition. Our findings 
indicate that the choice of definitions affects several  substantive conclusions about 
the exit behaviour of firms: (1) the aging pattern of the exit rate, (2) the relationship 
between firm size and exit, and (3) the impact of the control variables. 6 
First, and conform to the summary statistics mentioned before, we find that the 
exit rate of the base group? in the year of entry is considerably lower under the legal 
definition (0.23%) compared to the economic definition (2.18%). Second, even 
though both aging patterns show a positive slope, we find the increase with age to be 
more slowly under the economic definition (b=0.6775) than under the legal definition 
(b=1.3091). Neither result is surprising.  First, the lower exit rate under the legal 
definition can be attributed to the fact that firms may continue to operate, albeit under 
financial difficulties, without employees to postpone bankruptcy. For instance, firms 
may replace employees with temporary labour (which is not included in the number 
of employees reported) or outsource some of the activities to external suppliers, and 
thereby postpone or avoid legal exit while still being classified as an economic exit. 
As for the sharper increase under the legal definition after the first few years, this may 
be attributed to the time-consuming nature of the legal proceedings of bankruptcy. 
Weiss (1990), for example, reports an average time from filing the bankruptcy 
petition to resolution of 2.5 years  in the U.S., with a standard deviation of 1.4 years. 
For Belgian firms, the time from filing to resolution can take up to 5 years.8 As a 
consequence, one may not  observe many legal exits in the first few year(s), even 
when firms file for bankruptcy during the first months after entry, but as time 
progresses, more and more cases have moved through the legal system and reach 
actual legal exit. 
«INSERT TABLE 1 HERE» 
Third, also the impact of start-up size varies with the definition being used. 
Model A reports a negative and significant impact, which is consistent with the 
6 To determine whether the difference in the results between models A and B is due to the differences 
in the entry or differences in the exit definitions, we also estimated a model using the legal entry 
definition with the economic exit definition.  The results are very similar to model A, suggesting that 
the exit definition is the driving force. 
7 The base exit rate is obtained when all explanatory variables are zero. 
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aforementioned "stylised" empirical fact. However, model B, which uses the legal 
definitions, reports a positive and significant effect. Even though this result may look 
surprising at first, there is an intuitively appealing explanation for this finding. 
Firms that face financial difficulties will try to realise cost savings. These may 
be more easily realised for flexible resources than for fixed (committed) resources 
(Kaplan and Cooper, 1998). Typical examples of flexible resources, which can be 
acquired on a needs basis from external suppliers, are interim (temporary) labour and 
subcontracting. A reduction in the use of these resources generates an immediate cost 
saving. With respect to committed resources, on the other hand, the firm acquires the 
capacity before it is actually used. These costs are fixed, and a typical example is 
fixed assets. Employees who are 'permanent' also represent a fixed cost, especially 
when firms face a strict  employment protection legislation, as is the case in Belgium 
and many other European countries.9 Firms facing liquidity problems have an 
incentive to replace committed resources by flexible resources; i.e., to replace 
employees with interim labour and replace fixed assets with subcontracting. These 
actions will reduce unused capacity, thereby reducing total costs for the firm, and in 
tum postponing legal exit. 
How  is this related to our discussion on the impact of the size factor on exit 
behaviour? Two issues are important. First, since interim labour is not included in the 
number of employees reported in the financial statements, a switch to interim labour 
is useful in postponing legal exit, but not economic exit. Hence, the motivations for 
the negative relationship between size and exit behaviour as discussed in Section 1 
can explain economic exit while these same motivations need to be augmented with 
the flexible resources argument to explain legal exits. Second, especially smaller 
entrants are expected to benefit from interim labour and subcontracting. Small firms 
not only have fewer alternatives to use excess capacity in employees or fixed assets, 
but they also face less stringent social protection regulations than large firms. The 
latter may allow them to be faster in responding to shocks (less x-inefficiency). Put 
differently, smaller firms are more apt at using interim labour to postpone legal exit 
than large firms, which may explain the observed sign switch. 
8 Belgian National Institute for Statistics. 
9 The implied lower flexibility in terms of  job turnover is clearly demonstrated in labour economics 
(e.g. Garibaldi, Konings and Pissarides, 1997). 
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While intuitively appealing, this explanation can only have face validity when 
subcontracting and interim labour are indeed significant factors. With respect to 
subcontracting, Chalos (1995) states that functions and services that have traditionally 
been performed in-house are increasingly being obtained from outside vendors. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to see that interim labour has witnessed an enormous 
growth in Belgium and other European countries over recent years. fu particular, 
between 1985 and 1998, there was a five-fold increase in the number of hours worked 
by interim labour, and a more than five-fold increase in the number of  people that 
worked under interim contracts in Belgium (Peeters, 1999). 
Finally, the signs and significance of the coefficients of the control variables 
also vary with the definition used. Under the economic definition, the sector variables 
homogeneity, capital intensity and concentration index have a highly significant 
impact on exit rate. Under the legal exit definitions, however, new firms have 
significantly better survival chances in industries with a low MES while the other 
sector characteristics do not have a significant impact. The impact of economic 
conditions is as expected under both definitions: the more favourable the economic 
conditions during the start-up phase, the lower the exit rate. Not surprisingly, the 
impact of economic conditions is larger under the economic definition. 
Table 2 adds the impact of average industry wages per employee in the entry 
year to the set of explanatory variables. This variable indicates whether the firm 
operates in a high labour cost industry. fu terms of the interpretation offered above, 
the variable indicates to what extent the industry is characterised by high or low fixed 
costs. As expected, the addition of this variable does not affect our results for the legal 
definition, as interim labour offers a way around high fixed labour costs. For the 
economic definition, in contrast, we expect that high wage costs deter survival, and 
thus contribute to the firm's economic exit. We indeed find a positive and highly 
significant effect in model A of Table 2. This effect dominates the size effect, which 
becomes insignificant (yet stays negative). 
«INSERT TABLE 2 HERE» 
IV. Robustness checks 
Two of our main conclusions deal with the impact of the chosen definition on 
(1) the aging pattern, and (2) the sign reversal for the size variable.  fu the following 
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section, we consider two alternative explanations for these phenomena.  Specifically, 
we examine whether they are "model-induced" by the specific choice of the 
parametric baseline hazard (Weibull) and/or the absence of corrections for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Both issues have been shown to potentially affect the 
inferences on the time dependence of exit behaviour and the consistency of the cross-
sectional explanatory variables. 
IV.a. Aging pattern 
So far, the time dependence of the exit rate has been modelled with the 
Weibull distribution.  However, the true time dependence may be neither 
monotonically increasing nor monotonically decreasing, which are the two forms 
allowed under the Weibull distribution. Agarwal and Gort (1996), for example, find 
that hazard rates first increase, and then eventually fall.  They explain this pattern 
through the industry life cycle. In Table 3, we model the time dependence semi-
parametrically.  In the absence of a theoretical justification for choosing a particular 
distribution, this approach is preferred over imposing a particular (potentially 
incorrect) distribution, which would result in inconsistent parameter estimates. The 
semi-parametric approach we adopt (see McDonald and Van de Gucht, 1999 and the 
appendix for details), on the other hand, results in consistent estimates even when the 
true form of the underlying baseline hazard is lInknown, as shown in Meyer 
(1986,1990). Under this approach, the aging effect is measured as a piecewise 
approximation of an underlying, possibly very complex, continuous time-dependence 
pattern. The initial exit rate gives the exit rate of the base group in the first period. 
Positive (negative) jumps in the subsequent years indicate a higher (lower) exit rate 
compared to the first period. Given the small number of exits in the first year (only 2 
legal exits and no economic exits), the first period in our estimations consists of the 
first 2 years after entry, with an imposed equal annual exit rate for years 1 and 2. 
<<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE» 
With the semi-parametric specification in Table 3, the initial exit rate under 
the economic definition (model A) increases to 3.l9%, which again is higher than the 
initial exit rate under the legal definition (0.l7% in model B). As with the Weibull 
models, the aging pattern is upward sloping for both definitions: the annual 
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conditional exit rate in years 3 through 10 is always significantly higher than in the 
initial years, as is apparent from the positive and significant jumps in the exit rate. 
The two time patterns behave differently, however, as is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
annual exit rate is consistently higher under the economic definition, where the exit 
rate significantly increases in year 3, then seems relatively stable through year 6, after 
which it increases again, with a decrease in year 9 (ignoring year 10, which is based on 
only a small number of observations). Under the legal definition, on the other hand, the 
exit rate increases through year 5 after which it seems to stabilise with a small upward 
jump in year 9. 
«INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE» 
The signs and significance of the other coefficients are mainly unaffected by 
how the time dependence is modelled.  Start-up size remains negative (-0.4089) under 
the economic definition, and positive (2.5459) and significant under the legal 
definition.  The signs and significance of the industry control variables and economic 
conditions are also similar to those reported for the Weibull model. 
IV.b. Unobserved heterogeneity 
The specification used thus far may not fully account for all the heterogeneity in 
the exit rates.  illdeed, explicit control for unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to avoid 
incorrect inferences as to the true time-dependency of  the exit rate, and to avoid 
inconsistent estimates for the other parameters (which would be an alternative 
explanation for the sign switch of the size variable).  The spurious influences that can be 
made when this is not done are illustrated when assuming a situation where every firm 
has a constant exit probability over time, but some firms have a high probability while 
others have a low probability.  ill such a case the firms with a high exit probability will 
likely exit after a few periods, leaving a higher proportion of  firms with low exit 
probabilities.  Thus, fewer exits will be observed as time passes giving the incorrect 
impression that exit probabilities are decreasing over time.  Not accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity may not only yield a spurious negative duration dependence, 
but may also give inconsistent parameter estimates (Heckman and Singer (1984a, 
I 984b), and Manton, Singer and Woodbury (1992)). We follow the approach of 
Dekimpe et al. (1998) and Schmittlein and Morrison (1983) and let the initial exit rate 
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vary across firms according to a certain distribution, namely the gamma distribution. The 
details of  this approach can be found in the appendix. 
Table 4 reports the results.  Under the economic definition, accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity affects neither the estimated time dependence nor the impact 
of the explanatory variables  (compare model A of Table 4 with the same model in 
Table 3). The coefficient of variation, which measures the degree of heterogeneity of the 
initial exit rate across firms, indicates, however, that the unobserved heterogeneity is 
much larger under the legal definition (2.9151 compared to 0.0026 in model A).  With 
respect to the time dependence under the legal definition, this results in a much steeper 
aging pattern, while the initial exit rate (0.16%) remains unaffected. 
«INSERT TABLE 4 HERE» 
Figure 2 illustrates the time dependence when accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity under both definitions.  As was apparent from Table 4, accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity has little impact on the time dependence under the 
economic definition.  However, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity when it is high, as 
is the case under the legal definition, results in an understatement of  the time 
dependence, resulting in a lower annual conditional exit rate.  This figure illustrates 
once more that the definitions have a substantial impact on the conclusions that are 
drawn about the time dependence.  Under the economic definition, the time dependence 
appears much more stable: the annual exit rate ranges from 3.19% in year 1 to 6.33% in 
year 8 (ignoring year 10).  Under the legal definition, the time dependence is much 
steeper, ranging from 0.16% in year 1 to 13.88% in year 9 (again ignoring year 10). 
Here, the conditional exit probability rises each year. 
«INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE» 
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity also affects some of  the control 
variables under the legal definition.  For example, MES becomes insignificant, and 
the impact of macroeconomic conditions (-9.3240) is now comparable in size to the 
economic definition (-9.8622).  Yet, our substantive conclusion of a positive firm-size 
effect still holds. 
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v. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates the sensitivity of empirical findings about firm exit 
behaviour to the measurement of entry and exit.  For a dataset of 14,584 entrants we 
identify both the economic entry and exit, as well as the legal entry and exit.  The 
economic definition is based on the number of employees reported by the firm;  the 
firm's legal life starts when its VAT number is assigned and ends with the 
pronouncement of bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Our results show that these definitions matter: we find significant differences 
in both the time pattern of the exit probability and the impact of  cross-sectional 
variables. Firms are more likely to exit under the economic definition, but the age of 
the firm has greater impact under the legal definition.  Our results show furthermore 
that the negative relation between start-up size and exit probability holds only under 
the economic definition. One potential explanation that we offered for the observed 
positive relation under the legal definition was related to firms switching from fixed 
to more flexible resources such as interim labour and outsourcing to avoid or delay 
bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Which definition, the economic or the legal, is most relevant depends upon the 
questions one attempts to answer. The economic definition may be more appropriate 
when researching topics related to industrial organisation such as the impact of 
changing competitive conditions. The legal definition is more appropriate when 
examining questions related to start-up financing, cost of capital and default risk of 
financial instruments. An analysis of the time span between economic and legal exit 
may provide insights into the ability of firms to exchange fixed for flexible resources. 
While both definitions obviously have their value, our findings clearly warn applied 
researchers about the potential pitfalls of generalising empirical findings from one 
research stream to another research tradition. Indeed, some 'stylised' facts may be 
highly dependent upon the operationalisation of entry and exit definitions. 
Our discussion has also highlighted the role of temporary labour and 
outsourcing as a potential explanation for the difference between economic and legal 
exit, at least in a European context. Whether our findings also hold for other markets, 
like the US, needs to be investigated with similar data sets. 
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Table 1: The Weibull model 
Aging Ilattem: 


































***, **, * indicate significance at the 1  %, 5% and 10%, respectively, using 2-sided t-
tests. 
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Table 2: The Weibull model: impact of industry wages 
A  B 
Economic definition  Legal definition 
Aging Ilattem: 
initial exit rate  0.0196  0.0022 
b  0.6850***  1.3110*** 
Start-uIl size: 
Size  -0.4634  2.5370*** 
Industry variables: 
MES  -0.1605  0.3245** 
Homogenous  -0.l300***  -0.0214 
Capital intensity  1.4888***  0.4116 
Concentration  0.5607*  -0.5451 
Wages  0.0848***  0.0307 
Economic conditions: 
GDP  -12.6241***  -3.5218** 
LL  -11838.443  -6189.430 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1  %,5% and 10%, respectively, using 2-sided t-
tests. 
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Table 3:  Hazard model with semi-parametric aging effect 
A  B 
Economic definition  Legal definition 
Aging Qattern: 
initial exit rate  0.0319  0.0017 
jump in year 3  0.5133***  2.0727*** 
jump in year 4  0.4576***  2.4329*** 
jump in year 5  0.5485***  2.6529*** 
jump in year 6  0.5390***  2.6811 *** 
jump in year 7  0.6693***  2.6957*** 
jump in year 8  0.6841 ***  2.7801*** 
jump in year 9  0.6062***  2.8773*** 
jump in year 10+  1.005***  2.7094*** 
Start-uQ size: 
Size  -0.4089  2.5459*** 
Industry variables: 
MES  0.0057  0.3197** 
Homogenous  -0.0815*  0.0126 
Capital intensity  0.9566***  0.0081 
Concentration  0.5646**  -0.4874 
Wages  0.0655***  0.0229 
Economic conditions: 
GDP  -9.8638***  -3.4481 *** 
LL  -12003.287  -6137.314 
***,  **, * indicate significance at the 1  %, 5% and 10%, respectively, using 2-sided t-
tests. 
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Table 4:  Semi-parametric model: accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
A  B 
Economic definition  Legal definition 
Aging £attern: 
initial exit rate  0.0319  0.0016 
jump in year 3  0.5134***  2.1871 *** 
jump in year 4  0.4577***  2.7379*** 
jump in year 5  0.5486***  3.1894*** 
jump in year 6  0.5390***  3.4684*** 
jump in year 7  0.6694***  3.7257*** 
jump in year 8  0.6842***  4.0652*** 
jump in year 9  0.6062***  4.4474*** 
jump in year 10  1.0049***  4.5689*** 
Start-u£ size: 
Size  -0.4091  4.6959*** 
Indus:ITY variables: 
MES  0.0055  0.7018 
Homogenous  -0.0815*  0.0426 
Capital intensity  0.9571 ***  0.0015 
Concentration  0.5646*  -0.7237 
Wages  0.0654***  0.0319 
Economic conditions: 
GDP  -9.8622***  -9.3240*** 
CV  0.0026  2.9151 
LL  -12003.288  -6131.084 
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Figure 1: Semi-parametric model: time dependence of the exit rate 
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Figure 2: Semi-parametric model: time dependence of the exit rate when accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity 
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Appendix:  Methodology 
Let the random variable T denote the time between firm entry and exit 
(failure), with associated probability density function i(t) and cumulative density 




is the hazard, i.e. , the rate at which firms exit during period t given that they have not 
done so in the previous t-I periods since entry. The survival function S(t)=I-F(t) 
denotes the probability that exit does not occur for at least t periods.  To model the 
hazard rate as a function of covariates, we use the Cox (1972) formulation and let 
(2) 
where X  is a vector of explanatory variables, B is a vector of parameters, and ho is the 
exit rate of the base group (referred to as the 'initial exit rate' in our results). The base 
group consists of those firms for which all explanatory variables equal zero. A 
positive B-coefficient implies that a positive value of the associated variable augments 
the exit rate. 
When T follows a Weibull distribution, the exit rate varies as a power of t and 
the hazard rate becomes 
h(t) = ho  eb In(r)  efJ x,  (3) 
where b is the shape parameter.  When b>O (b<O) the hazard increases (decreases) 
with time.  When b=O, the hazard rate is constant (and the exponential model is 
obtained). 
The semi-parametric approach involves adding a vector of time-varying 
dummy variables, D(t), to the model: 1 
h(t) = ho  ef3 x  eC D(r) ,  (4) 
where c is a vector of coefficients. A separate variable is used for each period; for 
example, D(3) takes on the values (00 1 00 ...  ).2  ho then gives the exit rate of the 
base group in the first year. Positive (negative) c-coefficients indicate a higher (lower) 
exit rate compared to the first period (these coefficients are referred to as the 'jumps' 
] Examples of applications of  this semi-parametric approach include McDonald and Van de Gucht 
(1999), Dekimpe, Van de Gucht, Hanssens and Powers (1998) and Han and Hausman (1990). 
2 To avoid identification problems when simultaneously estimating c] and ho, no separate indicator 
variable is added for the first period. Defining Firm Exit: The Impact of Size and Age Revisited 
in our results). To estimate the parameters ho, c and E, maximum likelihood estimation 
is used. The contribution of the i-th firm to the likelihood function is given by the 
following expression : 
(5) 
where ti  is the number of observed periods until exit or censoring, and di is an 
indicator variable equal to one for censored observations (survivors) and zero for 
completed observations (firms that exit). The expression for the hazard function given 
in equation (4) can be substituted into equation (5) through the following general 
relationship (Lancaster, 1990; Ross, 1980): 
'; 
S; (t;) =  e-8;(';) where 8; (t;) = J  h;(u)du  (6) 
o 
To account for unobserved heterogeneity we follow Schmittlein and Morrison (1983) 
by weighting the conditional likelihood by the relative occurrence of its ho value by 
means of a gamma mixing distribution g(ho), in which case the unconditional likelihood 
becomes 
L,(t;) = f  L;VYlo) g(ho) dho  (7) 
o 
The log-likelihood function for N firms is then 
t 
where B;(t)= :~:>/lX;(jl+cD;(j)  (9) 
j=l 
and a and r are the location and shape parameters, respectively, of the gamma 
distribution.  The mean of the gamma distribution is given by E(ho)=rla.  The coefficient 
estimates of the ~ and c vectors should then be interpreted relative to ria.  The 
coefficient of variation, CV, can be interpreted as an indication of  the degree of 
heterogeneity of ho across firms: Defining Firm Exit: The Impact of Size and Age Revisited 
~varCho)  -1/2 
CV=  =r 
ECho) 
(10) 
A low r-value indicates a large amount of heterogeneity, whereas high values are 
obtained for relatively homogeneous populations. 